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I. INTRODUCTION 
The legendary songwriter of the 20th century, Bob Dylan once said: 
“you better start swimmin’ or you’ll sink like a stone [f]or the times they 
are a-changin’.”1  Since these words were recorded in 1963, and 
particularly in the age of the Internet of the last two decades, technology 
has advanced in such drastic and surprising ways that it has often been 
difficult to keep up with its growth.2  The pervasive and continuous 
expansion of technology seems to impact nearly every aspect of daily life, 
including copyright law and its enforcement.   Predominantly with the 
invention and advancement of the Internet, the ways in which consumers 
are able to access copyrighted works have expanded and become much 
easier.  For authors of copyrighted works, however, the battle of trying to 
protect their rights has become much more challenging in the digital and 
Internet age.  With the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
of 1998 (“DMCA”), Congress provided protection via safe harbor 
provisions for Internet service providers (“ISP’s”) against claims of 
secondary copyright infringement, unless the ISP’s had, what has become 
known as “red-flag knowledge” of infringing acts.3  Red-flag knowledge 
is defined statutorily as, “aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent.”4  The interpretation of what 
constitutes red-flag knowledge is the subject of this Comment. 
The United States government has always placed great value on 
protecting the rights of authors in their works. However, the U.S. 
government, through copyright legislation, seeks to protect not only the 
interests of authors, but also innovation.  The so-called Copyright Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution more broadly states that the purpose of copyright 
legislation is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”5  However, the Internet and 
specifically, malignant infringers who use the Internet as their medium, 
are straining the boundaries of copyright legislation’s ability to secure the 
inherent rights of authors in their works while also encouraging the 
dissemination of such works as Congress intended.   After all, what good 
is copyright protection if protected works cannot be distributed to the 
                                                                                                                                  
 1 BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ 
(Columbia Records 1964). 
 2 Id. 
 3 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2010). 
 4 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 5 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. (known as the Copyright Clause). 
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public to enjoy, be inspired by and learn from?  The Third Circuit noted 
that “the purpose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and 
productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of 
information, to promote learning, culture and development.”6  However, 
without effective copyright protection, and thus a means by which to hold 
infringers liable, there can be no monetary nor legal incentive for authors 
to create new works in order “to promote learning, culture and 
development.”7 
In the modern digital Internet age, infringement has modernized as 
well, posing new legal issues that Congress and the courts have tried to 
address.  Confronted with the growth of the Internet and use of digital 
technology, Congress updated the 1976 Copyright Act with several 
amendments known cumulatively as the DMCA.8  The focus of this 
Comment concerns the current circuit split that resulted when the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC9 defined the 
“red-flag knowledge” requirement much more narrowly than the Ninth 
Circuit did in Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung.10   This Comment 
proposes that Supreme Court and Congressional intervention is necessary 
in order to restore the intended balance established by the Copyright Act 
between the rights of authors to their works and the rights of the public to 
those works by adopting a modified version of the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of “red-flag knowledge” under the DMCA.11 
In order to understand how the courts came to their respective 
decisions regarding “red-flag knowledge,” it is important to understand 
the history behind the development of copyright law, both through 
legislation and case law. The next section will focus on the legislative 
history of modern copyright law as it pertains to this circuit split. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
“‘There must be some kind of way out of here’, said the joker to the 
thief. ‘There’s too much confusion, I can’t get no relief.’”12  In order to 
keep up with the changing times, Congress has updated and modified the 
copyright statutes periodically throughout U.S. history. The 1909 
Copyright Act was the precursor to copyright protection as it stands today; 
                                                                                                                                  
 6 Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 7 Id. 
 8 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2010). 
 9 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 10 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 11 Id. (referencing §512(c)(1)(B) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the 
provision known colloquially as the “red-flag knowledge” requirement). 
 12 BOB DYLAN, All Along the Watchtower, on JOHN WESLEY HARDING (Columbia 
Records 1967). 
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prior to 1909, copyright laws were based off of England’s Statute of 
Anne.13  Modern copyright law is codified in Title 17 of the U.S. 
Constitution, commonly referred to as the 1976 Copyright Act (“the 
Copyright Act”).14  There are two fundamental prerequisites for copyright 
protection that a copyright holder must satisfy in order for their work to be 
eligible for protection. “[C]opyright protection subsists . . .  in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, 
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.”15  The Copyright Act also created six exclusive rights of copyright 
ownership that allow the author, 
To do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public 
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical dramatic and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicty; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomime, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the 
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly 
by means of a digital audio transmission.16 
Through all of these protections and exclusive rights, the ultimate 
goal of the Copyright Act is “to promote learning, culture, and 
development” by way of the useful arts, for the betterment of society.17  
However, in order to promote this stated goal, it is fundamentally 
necessary for the law and courts of this country to protect the rights of 
authors of copyrightable works in order to incentivize the innovation and 
creation of original works by authors.18  Otherwise, the public will begin 
to see a decline in the production of original works of authorship without 
legal guarantees that an author may reap the rewards from his original 
work and be protected from piracy and infringement.19 
                                                                                                                                  
 13 The Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349 (1909) (amended by 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101-810 (1976)) (referencing the Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Ann. c. 21 (Eng.)). 
 14 The 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976). 
 15 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1990) (emphasis added). 
 16 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6) (2002). 
 17 Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d at 1235. 
 18 See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 19 See id. 
2018] An Analysis of Red-Flag Knowledge Under the DMCA 321 
III. THE DMCA 
“Come Senators, Congressmen please heed the call. Don’t stand in 
the doorway, don’t block up the hall. For he that gets hurt, will be he who 
has stalled. The battle outside raging will soon shake your windows and 
rattle your walls. For the times they are a-changin’.”20  The DMCA was 
enacted to “ensure[] that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to 
improve and that the variety and quality of services on the Internet will 
expand.”21  Recognizing that this new digital age presented new problems, 
Congress established additional protections for authors and safe harbors 
for service providers to strike a balance between the two competing 
interests.22  Section 512(c) of the DMCA provides several “safe harbor” 
provisions.  Service providers can use these provisions as an affirmative 
defense to protect them from direct or secondary copyright infringement 
liability stemming from the infringing acts of their users.23  Section 512(c) 
of the DMCA provides that: 
(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users. 
 (1) In general. A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, 
or, except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, 
for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a 
user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by 
or for the service provider, if the service provider— 
(A) 
 (i)    does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using 
the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is 
infringing; 
 (ii)  in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
 (iii)  upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material; 
(B)  does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to 
control such activity; and 
(C)  upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), 
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.24 
The DMCA’s pronouncement that “[n]othing in this section shall be 
construed to condition the applicability of subsections (a) through (d) 
on . . . a service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking 
facts indicating infringing activity . . . ” is important because it means that 
an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) is under no affirmative duty to seek 
                                                                                                                                  
 20 BOB DYLAN, supra note 2. 
 21 Venus Fashions, Inc. v. ContextLogic, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-907-J-39MCR, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 155748, at *36 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2017) (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2 
(1998)). 
 22 Id. 
 23 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2010) (referring to the provisions of the statute). 
 24 Id. 
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out infringers.25  However, the ISPs are required to maintain a notice-and-
takedown system.26  This system affords copyright owners the ability to 
notify the ISP of infringing activity on their sites.  In order to be eligible 
for the safe harbor provision, the ISP must act on the notice provided by 
the copyright owner by taking down or removing the infringing material 
from their site.27  Additionally, an ISP must be able to show that it qualifies 
as a “service provider” as defined by § 512(k)(1).28  The statute defines 
this term as “an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of 
connections for digital online communications, between or among points 
specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without 
modification to the content of the material as sent or received.”29 
Secondary liability, on the other hand, is different from direct 
liability and can occur in several different circumstances. As explained in 
MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., “[o]ne infringes contributorily by 
intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement . . . and 
infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining 
to exercise a right to stop or limit it.”30  While the Copyright Act does not 
specifically mention secondary liability, principles of secondary liability 
are rooted in common law doctrines and are well established in case law. 
IV. HISTORY AND TIMELINE OF RELEVANT CASE LAW 
A. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 
One of the first and most important cases to involve issues of 
secondary liability on the part of ISPs for the infringing acts of their users 
was MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., decided by the United States 
Supreme Court in 2005.31  Grokster involved a suit initiated by various 
copyright holders, including movie studios, record companies, songwriters 
and music publishers (“MGM”) against a software distributor 
(“Grokster”).32  The Court was asked to decide “under what circumstances 
the distributor of a product capable of both lawful and unlawful use is 
liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties using the 
product.”33 
                                                                                                                                  
 25 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1) (2010). 
 26 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2010). 
 27 Id. 
 28 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2010). 
 29 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (2010). 
 30 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). 
 31 See id. 
 32 See id. 
 33 Id. at 918-19. 
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Grokster’s services were primarily used by individuals to share and 
disseminate copyrighted music and movie files without permission.34  
MGM alleged that Grokster “knowingly and intentionally distributed their 
software to enable users to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted in 
violation of the Copyright Act.”35  Grokster actively monitored and kept 
track of copyrighted songs that were available through its services, even 
so much as allowing users to search for obviously copyrighted songs listed 
on top charts.36  In fact, Grokster’s internal email suggested that they had 
actual knowledge of infringing activity.37  Specifically, that its business 
plan was intentionally targeted at servicing former Napster users to allow 
them to continue the copyright infringing activities that led to the 
shutdown of Napster.38 
The District Court in the initial proceeding granted summary 
judgement in favor of Grokster.39  The Court of Appeals affirmed, reading 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. as holding that 
“distribution of a commercial product capable of substantial non-
infringing uses could not give rise to [secondary] liability for infringement 
unless the distributor had actual knowledge of specific instances of 
infringement and failed to act on that knowledge.”40  The Supreme Court 
identified the issue as causing a tension between “the respective 
[copyright] values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright 
protection and promoting innovation in new communication technologies 
by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright infringement.”41  The 
Court created what it called “the inducement rule,” ultimately holding that 
“one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps 
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement 
by third parties.”42  The Court, in overturning the lower courts’ decisions, 
noted that simple knowledge on the part of a service provider of a potential 
infringing activity or even actual infringement taking place would be 
insufficient to impose liability.43 
                                                                                                                                  
 34 See id. 
 35 MGM Studios Inc., 545 U.S. at 921. 
 36 See id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. (referencing “Napster”, a peer-to-peer sharing website that was a precursor to 
“Grokster” and was intended to allow users to share copyrighted works with each other on 
peer-to-peer networks without authorization from the copyright owners). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 927 (referencing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417 (1984)). 
 41 MGM Studios Inc., 545 U.S. at 928. 
 42 Id. at 937. 
 43 See id. (short cite this) 
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The Court was persuaded by three factors in ultimately finding that 
the service provider in this case was secondarily liable for the infringing 
acts of its users.44  First, the fact that the service provider made it known 
that it was attempting to “satisfy a known source of demand for copyright 
infringement” was telling.45  Second, the service provider made no effort 
to develop tools or processes to monitor or reduce infringing activity on 
its servers.46  Finally, the Court noted that the service providers made 
money by selling advertisement space on its site; the more user traffic to 
the site, the more ad money the companies received, thus demonstrating 
an intent to promote use of its site without regard for illegal activity.47  The 
Court made it clear that, “if liability for inducing infringement is 
ultimately found . . . [it will be on the basis of] inferring a patently illegal 
objective from statements and actions showing what that objective was.”48  
As a result, the stage was set and the standard was established for which 
activities would amount to secondary liability in the eyes of the Court. 
B. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. 
Next, the Viacom decision addressed the contours of the safe harbor 
provision codified in the DMCA under § 512(c).49  Viacom set the 
precedent (before Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC) in the Second 
Circuit for what has become known as red-flag knowledge on the part of 
service providers.50  The Second Circuit set out “to clarify the contours of 
the safe harbor provision of the [DMCA] that limits the liability of online 
service providers for copyright infringement that occurs ‘by reason of the 
storage at the direction of a user of materials on a system or network 
controlled or operated by the service provider.’”51 The Plaintiffs in the case 
were a group of film studios, music publishers, television networks, etc.52 
The Plaintiffs (“Viacom”) alleged that the Defendant (“YouTube”) was 
both directly and secondarily liable for copyright infringement of their 
works due to the public performance, display, and reproduction of 
thousands of video clips containing copyrighted material.53 
                                                                                                                                  
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 939. 
 46 See id. 
 47 MGM Studios Inc., 545 U.S. at 939. 
 48 Id. at 941. 
 49 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 19. 
 50 Id. at 32 (referencing Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 
2016)). 
 51 Id. at 25 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2010). 
 52 See id. 
 53 Id. 
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The District Court reasoned that based upon the evidence submitted 
by Viacom, “a jury could find that the defendants not only were generally 
aware of, but welcomed, copyright-infringing material being placed on 
their website.”54  The Second Circuit applied a de novo standard of review 
as to whether YouTube could be eligible for safe harbor protection under 
§ 512(c)(1)(A) of the DMCA.55 As previously stated, § 512(c)(1)(A) 
affords safe harbor protection only if the service provider: 
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the 
material on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material . . . .56 
Specifically, upon acquiring actual or red-flag knowledge, the ISP 
must remove the infringing material. 57  Therefore, there are specific 
threshold requirements an ISP must meet in order to be eligible for safe 
harbor protection from infringement liability. The vagueness of what 
constitutes “actual knowledge” and red-flag knowledge within the statute 
perpetuated the dispute in this case.58 
Viacom argued that Congress’s use of the phrase “facts and 
circumstances” in § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) demonstrated that it did not intend to 
have a limited interpretation of red-flag knowledge as only being one 
defined type of knowledge.59  Viacom contended that an interpretation of 
red-flag knowledge that requires specific awareness of infringements 
effectively renders the provision superfluous “because that provision 
would be satisfied only when the ‘actual knowledge’ provision is also 
satisfied.”60  Thus, Viacom argued that this red-flag provision “requires 
less specificity than the actual knowledge provision[]” and thus allows for 
secondary liability when the “facts and circumstances” of the case do not 
amount to actual knowledge of infringing activity.61 
The court, in rejecting Viacom’s argument, stated that such a specific 
interpretation does not make the red-flag knowledge provision superfluous 
because historically actual knowledge denotes subjective belief.62  
Alternatively, “courts often invoke the language of ‘facts or 
circumstances,’ which appears in [the red-flag provision], in discussing an 
                                                                                                                                  
 54 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 55 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 19 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2010). 
 56 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2010). 
 57 See id. 
 58 Viacom, 676 F.3d 19. 
 59 Id. (referencing, § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) known as the “red-flag knowledge” requirement 
provision). 
 60 Id. at 31. 
 61 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 62 See id. 
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objective reasonableness standard.”63 Thus, the standard adopted by the 
Viacom court was that, “the actual knowledge provision turns on whether 
the provider actually or ‘subjectively’ knew of specific infringement, 
while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively 
aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement 
‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”64  The court, in support of 
its holding, referenced other court opinions with similar holdings stating, 
“[w]e do not place the burden of determining whether [materials] are 
actually illegal on a service provider” consequently emphasizing that only 
awareness of “specific and identifiable instances of infringement will 
disqualify a service provider from the safe harbor.”65 
C. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC 
UMG Recordings also addressed the issue of red-flag knowledge 
under the DMCA’s safe harbor provision, in which the court affirmed the 
district court’s decision that the service providers could indeed avail 
themselves of the provision.66  The Plaintiffs (“UMG”), who are music 
publishing companies, record labels, and copyright owners, appealed from 
the grant of summary judgement in favor of the Defendants (“Veoh”) to 
the Ninth Circuit, which reviewed the case de novo.67 
Veoh was a service provider that “operate[d] a publicly accessible 
website that enable[d] users to share videos with other users[]” that could 
be viewed on the website or through a standalone software application.68  
While Veoh did not charge its users to access its content, the company 
derived its income from advertisements that were displayed along with the 
video.69  Veoh also required its users to read and agree to its “Publisher 
Terms and Conditions” which informs users that they were prohibited 
from uploading or submitting any infringing material that they did not 
have a license from the copyright owner to use.70  However, employees of 
Veoh “[did] not review the user-submitted video, title or tags before the 
video [was] made available.”71 
                                                                                                                                  
 63 Id. at 31 (See, e.g., Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 64 Viacom, 676 F.3d at 31. 
 65 Viacom, 676 at 32 (quoting UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 
667 F.3d 1022, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
 66 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 
2013) (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)). 
 67 See id. 
 68 Id. at 1011. 
 69 Id. at 1006. 
 70 Id. at 1011. 
 71 Id. at 1012. 
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Veoh’s site contained millions of submitted videos, some of which 
had been found to infringe the copyrights of various copyright owners, 
including UMG and the other Plaintiffs.72  To combat the submissions of 
infringing materials by its users, Veoh employed two different 
technologies that worked to automatically stop copyright infringement 
from occurring on its service.73  One of these technologies was called 
“hash filtering” which “disable[d] access to an infringing video . . . [and] 
automatically disable[d] access to any identical videos and block[ed] any 
subsequently submitted duplicates.”74  The other automatic technology 
Veoh employed was a third-party filtering system that “[took] audio 
fingerprints from video files and compare[d] them to a database of 
copyrighted content . . . [when] a user attempt[ed] to upload a video that 
matche[d] a fingerprint from [the database], the video never [became] 
available for viewing.”75  In order to comply with copyright laws, Veoh 
also implemented a company policy of removing user accounts that 
repeatedly uploaded infringing material.76 
Despite these precautions, when Veoh applied the filter to its 
backlog, 60,000 videos had to be removed for containing infringing 
material.77  UMG alleged that Veoh was liable for “direct, vicarious and 
contributory copyright infringement, and for inducement of 
infringement   . . . [and] that Veoh’s efforts to prevent copyright 
infringement on its system were too little too late.”78  UMG also alleged 
that Veoh “harbored infringing material for its own benefit” and took 
minimal efforts to prevent users from submitting, downloading and 
accessing infringing material.79  UMG argued that Veoh did not qualify 
for safe harbor protection because it failed to meet three of the statutory 
requirements under § 512(c), including both the actual knowledge and so-
called red-flag knowledge requirements.80  Specifically, UMG contended 
that “genuine issues of fact remain about whether Veoh had actual 
knowledge of infringement, or was ‘aware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity [wa]s apparent.’”81  Regarding the district court’s 
decision that Veoh did not have red-flag knowledge, UMG’s appeal 
                                                                                                                                  
 72 UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d 1006. 
 73 See id. 
 74 Id. at 1012. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 1006. 
 77 Id., at 1013. 
 78 UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1013 (internal quotations omitted). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1013 (referring to 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (known as the actual 
knowledge requirement and so-called “red-flag” knowledge requirement)). 
 81 Id. at 1015 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)). 
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claimed that the court erred by “setting too stringent a standard for what 
[the court] termed ‘red flag’ [knowledge].”82 
Evidence presented at trial demonstrated that Veoh hosted a large 
amount of content for which it did not have a license, and therefore UMG 
argued that Veoh should have known “this content was unauthorized, 
given its general knowledge that its services could be used to post 
infringing material” and that constituted red-flag knowledge of 
infringement on Veoh’s behalf.83  However, the Court rejected UMG’s 
claim because there were in fact many videos with copyrightable content 
that could legally be displayed on Veoh’s site for which they had obtained 
the necessary license from the copyright owners.84  The court stated that if 
it were to accept that “merely hosting material that falls within a category 
of content capable of copyright protection, with general knowledge that 
one’s services could be used to share unauthorized [content], was 
sufficient to impute knowledge to service providers,” the safe harbor 
provision would be useless and no service provider could be eligible.85  In 
support of this finding, the court quoted its holding in A&M Records, Inc. 
v. Napster, that “‘absent any specific information which identifies 
infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for 
contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system 
allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.’”86 
The court also reasoned that the district court’s holding that specific 
knowledge is needed to find a service provider ineligible for the safe 
harbor provision made sense “in the context of the DMCA, which 
Congress enacted to foster cooperation among copyright holders and 
service providers in dealing with infringement on the Internet.”87  In 
accordance with this stated legislative objective, the court found that 
because copyright owners know exactly which works they own, they are 
actually in a better position to pinpoint infringing copies on a service 
provider’s network.88  The court emphasized that “Congress made a 
considered policy determination that the ‘DMCA notification procedures 
[would] place the burden of policing copyright infringement – identifying 
the potentially infringing material and adequately documenting 
infringement – squarely on the owners of copyright,’” and the Court 
                                                                                                                                  
 82 Id. at 1020. This is where the term “red-flag” comes from when referring to the 
knowledge needed under § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 83 Id. at 1021. 
 84 UMG Recordings, Inc., 718 F.3d at 1021. 
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declined to shift that burden to the service providers.89  The court 
ultimately held that Veoh’s general knowledge that copyrighted material 
was present on its servers and that those servers could be used for illicit 
infringing activity was insufficient for a finding of red-flag knowledge.90 
The UMG court did recognize and agreed with the premise from 
Viacom that there is a definitive distinction between what constitutes 
actual knowledge and red-flag knowledge.91  In addressing the sufficiency 
of UMG’s evidence that Veoh had been sent emails informing them of 
documented infringements, the court stated that “[i]f this notification had 
come from a third party, such as Veoh user, rather than from a copyright 
holder, it might meet the red flag test because it specified particular 
infringing material.”92  However, in order for a copyright holder to create 
a genuine issue of material fact, as is required to withstand summary 
judgment in a civil matter, the copyright holder must also produce 
evidence that the ISP failed to “expeditiously [] remove, or disable access 
to, the material.”93  In the end, UMG failed to establish that there was 
sufficient evidence to disqualify Veoh from DMCA safe harbor protection, 
in part because they were unable to meet the standard for a finding of red-
flag knowledge.94 
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND ANALYSIS 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion: 
Finally, the circuit split at issue was created when the Ninth Circuit 
and the Second Circuit each took drastically different approaches to the 
question of what constitutes red-flag knowledge.  At the outset, it is helpful 
to analyze the older of the two cases that comprise one side of the relevant 
circuit split. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit decided Columbia Pictures Indus. 
v. Fung. 95 Defendant Gary Fung and his company isoHunt Web 
Technologies, Inc. (collectively “Fung”) appealed a district court decision 
in which the court granted the Plaintiff’s (“Columbia Pictures”) summary 
judgment motion and found Fung liable for contributory infringement and 
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inducing others to infringe Columbia Pictures’ copyrighted material.96 The 
district court also held that none of the safe harbors in section 512 of the 
DMCA were applicable in the case.97 The Plaintiffs were comprised of 
various film studios who owned the copyrights to many of the videos and 
movies that were provided for streaming purposes on Fung’s websites.98 
Columbia Pictures alleged in its amended complaint that “Fung was 
liable for vicarious and contributory copyright infringement, in violation 
of [The 1976 Copyright Act].”99  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Columbia Pictures, holding that Fung was indeed 
liable for his role in inducing others to participate in the infringement of 
Columbia Pictures’ copyrighted works, thus constituting contributory 
copyright infringement.100  The district court found that Fung was 
ineligible to avail himself of the safe harbor provisions under § 512(c).101  
The court subsequently issued a permanent injunction to prevent Fung 
from knowingly engaging in or fostering infringing activities of specific 
copyrighted works owned by Columbia Pictures.102  Fung was provided 
with a list of movie titles that the injunction applied to including several 
public domain works, such as The Jungle Book and Miracle on 34th 
Street.103 
In analyzing Fung’s affirmative defense as it relates to § 512(c), the 
Ninth Circuit explained that the statute “covers not just the storage of 
infringing material, but also infringing ‘activit[ies]’ that ‘us[e] the material 
[stored] on the system or network.’”104  In this case, the infringing 
activities associated with Fung – peer-to-peer exchanges of pirated 
materials – relied on the torrents that were stored, operated and maintained 
by Fung’s websites.105  The court explained that the “torrents [that were] 
collected for storage by Fung’s websites themselves [as opposed to ones 
uploaded by users] . . . would be at least facially eligible for the safe 
                                                                                                                                  
 96 Id. at 1023-24 (referencing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
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harbor,” that is assuming that the other § 512(c) knowledge and 
expeditious removal criteria were met.106 
In UMG Recordings, the court restated its adoption of the Second 
Circuit’s interpretation of the knowledge requirement in § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) 
for a finding of red-flag knowledge as, “turn[ing] on whether the provider 
was subjectively aware of the facts that would have made the specific 
infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a reasonable person.”107  Fung 
argued that because Columbia Pictures did not provide him with statutorily 
required notice of infringing activities on his site, he lacked both actual 
knowledge and red-flag knowledge.108  The explicit language of the statute 
makes it clear that when notice of infringement provided to an ISP does 
not comply with the statutory requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A), it “shall not 
be considered . . . in determining whether a service provider has actual 
knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity is apparent[].”109 However, the court found that it did not need to 
determine the adequacy of the notice of infringing activities provided by 
Columbia Pictures to Fung based upon other factors.110 
Here, the court found that Fung indeed “had ‘red flag’ knowledge of 
a broad range of infringing activity for reasons independent of any 
notifications from Columbia, and therefore [was] ineligible for the 
§ 512(c) safe harbor.”111  The record before the court contained numerous 
instances of explicit evidence proving that Fung encouraged the users of 
his site to upload and download certain copyrighted materials in an 
infringing manner, assisted his users in seeking copyrighted materials to 
view, and aided them in reproducing copyrighted works on DVDs.112  In 
finding that Fung’s knowledge of such activity was sufficient to meet the 
UMG Recordings standard for red-flag knowledge, the court reasoned 
that: 
[t]he material in question was sufficiently current and well-known that it 
would have been objectively obvious to a reasonable person that the material 
solicited and assisted was both copyrighted and not licensed to random 
members of the public, and that the induced use was therefore infringing.113 
The standard used by the court in holding that Fung had red-flag 
knowledge assumes that the “objectively obvious to a reasonable person” 
standard can be met when someone is aware of material present on a server 
                                                                                                                                  
 106 Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1042–43 (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)). 
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that is “sufficiently current and well-known.”114  By way of example, the 
court referred to the presence of movies on Fung’s sites with titles such as 
“Casino Royale,” concluding that it would be objectively obvious to a 
reasonable person that the movies were copyrighted material.115  
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit adopted an “objectively obvious” standard for 
determining red-flag knowledge when an ISP is aware of “sufficiently 
current, well-known” or famous works on their site.116 
B. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC 
In 2016, the Second Circuit took a position contrary to the Columbia 
Pictures decision, which created a circuit split regarding the standard for 
finding red-flag knowledge of infringing activity on the part of an ISP 
under § 512(c).117  The Defendant (“Vimeo”) was an ISP “which 
operate[d] a website on which members [could] post videos of their own 
creation, which [were] then accessible to the public at large.”118  The 
Plaintiffs (“Capitol Records”) were music publishing companies and 
record labels that held copyrights for sound recordings of musical 
performances.119  Capitol Records brought suit against Vimeo in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging 
“that Vimeo [was] liable . . . for copyright infringement by reason of 199 
videos posted to the Vimeo website, which contained allegedly infringing 
musical recordings for which [Capitol Records] owned the rights.”120  In 
relevant part, the district court refused to grant summary judgment to 
either party with respect to certain videos because it concluded that there 
was “a question of material fact whether Vimeo possessed so-called ‘red-
flag’ knowledge of circumstances that made infringement apparent.”121  
The denial of summary judgement led to the interlocutory appeal.122 
The relevant certified question on appeal was “[w]hether, under the 
holding of Viacom, a service provider’s viewing of a user-generated video 
containing all or virtually all of a recognizable, copyrighted song may 
establish ‘facts or circumstances’ giving rise to ‘red flag’ knowledge of 
infringement.”123  As of 2012, Vimeo’s website contained over 31 million 
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videos with over 12 million registered users from all over the world.124  
Every Vimeo user was required to create an account with the site, and, 
depending on what type of account the user elects to sign up for, they may 
have had to pay a subscription fee.125  However, any Internet user, 
regardless of whether they had an account, could “view, download, and 
copy videos posted on the website for free.”126  Vimeo also derived 
revenue from advertisements that appeared on its site, and therefore it can 
be inferred that the more viewers that visited the site, the more revenue 
Vimeo received.127  This point is significant because “[u]nder 
§ 512(c)(1)(B), a service provider loses protection under the safe harbor 
if . . . the provider ‘receive[s] a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity” and accordingly courts have taken into account the fact 
that when an ISP derives money from site traffic, it is evidence of their 
willingness to allow infringing activity on the site.128 
Vimeo allowed its users to post videos on its website without 
“intervention or active involvement of Vimeo staff” and its employees 
“[did] not watch or prescreen videos before they [were] made available on 
the website.”129  However, every Vimeo user was required to read and 
accept the site’s Terms of Service, which, among other things, required 
users to possess the necessary rights and licenses for copyrighted works 
and prohibited them from uploading infringing materials.130  Nonetheless, 
users were able to upload infringing materials despite these rules.131  
Vimeo had a “Community Team” that it employed to “curate 
content . . . occasionally prepare commentary on a video, offer technical 
assistance to users . . . and at times inspect videos suspected of violating 
Vimeo’s policies.”.132  Several computer programs were also used by 
Vimeo to assist the team in finding and removing videos that violated 
Vimeo’s Terms of Service, and each selected video was then viewed by a 
Vimeo employee.133  Additionally, users had the ability to “flag” videos 
that they thought violated the Terms of Service.134  These flagged videos 
were then brought to the attention of the Vimeo staff.135 
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Capitol Records argument was that there was sufficient evidence on 
the record for the district court to conclude on summary judgement that 
the Vimeo staff and employees had sufficient notice to satisfy the red-flag 
knowledge standard.136  While Capitol Records had previously sent Vimeo 
notices of infringing videos, which Vimeo removed “expeditiously,” the 
videos that were involved in this suit were never the subject of any of those 
notices.137  Capitol Records presented transcripts of emails and Vimeo user 
chats between users and Vimeo employees containing questions about 
posting infringing content.138  When asked about posting infringing 
materials, members of the Community Team said, “[w]e allow it” and 
“[o]ff the record . . . [g]o ahead and post it . . . .”139  Capital Records 
argued that the evidence showing this pattern of behavior and complicity 
on the part of Vimeo should be sufficient to prove the awareness by Vimeo 
of “facts and circumstances” as is required to find red-flag knowledge, but 
the Second Circuit was not convinced.140 
In analyzing Capitol Records’ claim that the evidence was sufficient 
to show Vimeo had red-flag knowledge, the court relied on Viacom’s 
“objectively obvious to a reasonable person” standard.141  In interpreting 
this standard, the court stated that “[t]he hypothetical ‘reasonable person’ 
to whom infringement must be obvious is an ordinary person – not 
endowed with specialized knowledge or expertise concerning music or the 
laws of copyright.”.142  The court applied this standard in determining 
whether evidence of an employee viewing a video with infringing material 
constituted red-flag knowledge.143 This court held that: 
[t]he mere fact that an employee of the service provider has viewed a video 
posted by a user (absent specific information regarding how much of the 
video the employee saw or the reason why it was viewed), and that the video 
contains all or nearly all of a copyrighted song that is ‘recognizable’ would 
be insufficient . . . to make infringement obvious to an ordinary reasonable 
person, who is not an expert in music or the law of copyright.144 
This narrow interpretation by the court is in direct conflict with the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision on the same issue, and thus creating the circuit 
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split as to the appropriate standard for determining what constitutes red-
flag knowledge.145 
The court provided several reasons for its holding.  First, the court 
explained that the burdens of proof that each party must bear in such a 
matter influenced the decision.146  Since an ISP’s entitlement to the safe 
harbor provision under § 512(c) is an affirmative defense, if the defendant 
raised the defense, it then established its eligibility.147  However, the court 
found that “whether a service provider should be disqualified based on the 
copyright owner’s accusation of misconduct . . . or [] acquiring actual or 
red flag knowledge – the burden of proof more appropriately shifts to the 
plaintiff.”148  The Second Circuit reasoned that to require a service 
provider to know every time an employee discovers potentially infringing 
material and expect that employee to be able to recognize infringing 
material would “largely destroy the benefit of the safe harbor Congress 
intended to create.”149 
The court found that an employee’s viewing of a video containing 
copyrightable material may be brief and alone should not be enough to 
find red-flag knowledge.150  The court also reasoned that “the fact that 
music is ‘recognizable . . . or even famous . . . is insufficient to 
demonstrate that the music was in fact recognized by a hypothetical 
ordinary individual who has no specialized knowledge of the field of 
music.”151  Finally, in a similar vein, the court explained that those who 
work for ISPs and who will encounter these materials, “cannot be assumed 
to have expertise in the laws of copyright . . . . [n]or can every employee 
of a service provider be automatically expected to know how likely . . . the 
user who posted the material had authorization.”152  Therefore, the 
standard the court ultimately established for a finding of red-flag 
knowledge on the part of an ISP was that there must be “evidence 
sufficient to carry their burden of proving that Vimeo personnel . . . knew 
facts making that conclusion obvious to an ordinary person who had no 
specialized knowledge of music or the laws of copyright.”153  This 
standard set forth by the court effectively narrows down the circumstances 
in which a court may find red-flag knowledge significantly from the 
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standard set by Columbia Pictures.154  “So let us stop talkin’ falsely now[,] 
the hour’s getting late”.155 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT’S STANDARD 
The Supreme Court should adopt an interpretation of “red-flag” 
knowledge under § 512(c) of the DMCA in a way that comports with the 
Ninth Circuit’s standard.156  Such a ruling would provide copyright owners 
the realistic ability to protect their statutorily enumerated rights from 
infringement by users of “service providers” as the term is defined in the 
DMCA.157 
The biggest distinction between the Ninth and the Second Circuit’s 
opinions in this context is that the Second Circuit’s opinion limits what 
would constitute red-flag knowledge to such a fine set of circumstances.158  
This interpretation effectively makes it impossible for any copyright 
owner to prove that an ISP had such knowledge.159  On the other hand, the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion allows copyright owners the reasonable ability to 
hold the ISP’s liable.160  This section will analyze why the Second Circuit’s 
standard sets an unrealistically high bar for a copyright holder—as the 
plaintiff in an infringement claim—to satisfy in order to prevail on that 
claim.161  In addition, this section will set forth the reasons why the 
Supreme Court should look to common-law tort principles, such as 
negligence liability and respondeat superior to justify the broader 
interpretation of red-flag knowledge provided by the Ninth Circuit.  
Finally, a look at the interests of both copyright owners, whose works are 
typically transmitted across digital platforms, and those of Internet service 
providers, will demonstrate why the proper balance of these interests is 
met by adopting the Ninth Circuit’s red-flag knowledge standard. 
A. The Second Circuit’s Standard Sets an Unrealistically High Bar 
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of what constitutes “red-flag” 
knowledge under the DMCA sets a standard that is unrealistically high, a 
standard which essentially no copyright owner would be able to satisfy, 
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thus rendering the safe harbor provision a catch-all.162  The safe harbor 
provision under § 512(c) of the DMCA was intended to provide shelter 
from liability for ISPs whose platforms were being abused by copyright 
infringers against the wishes or without the knowledge of the ISP.163  
Conversely, the requirements for safe harbor eligibility were intended to 
prevent malignant ISPs who knowingly allowed, or even encouraged 
copyright infringement on their platforms from availing themselves of the 
provision.164  Congress intended to provide a means of recovery for 
copyright owners and maintain the balance of interests between copyright 
owners and Internet Service Providers (“ISP’s”) through the 
implementation of the DMCA.165  However, the Second Circuit’s 
interpretation of “red-flag” knowledge denies many copyright owners the 
ability to obtain relief from infringement of their exclusive rights and 
destroys that intended balance.166 
Citing to Nimmer on Copyright, the Second Circuit in Capitol 
Records stated that the burden of initially establishing entitlement to the 
safe harbor provision rests on the defendant ISP.167  Once established, 
however, the burden to prove actual or “red-flag” knowledge would then 
shift back to the plaintiff.168  The court reasoned that in order to satisfy this 
burden, it is not enough for a copyright owner to show that infringing 
material appeared on the ISP’s site, or even that an employee saw all of 
the copyrighted work.169  In order to satisfy the standard of proving that an 
ISP was subjectively aware of “facts and circumstances” that would make 
it objectively obvious to a reasonable person, the copyright owner must 
demonstrate that the employee who viewed the material was an expert in 
both the legal and music industries.170 
The likelihood of a copyright owner, who is an outsider to an ISP and 
likely has little to no knowledge about the employees of the ISP, would be 
able to identify the one employee who viewed the infringing material and 
has the expertise required to satisfy this burden is minimal at best.  It defies 
logic to require a copyright owner to prove that a specific employee at an 
ISP had such extensive knowledge.  In addition to being a very high 
standard to meet, this burden is also extremely vague.  To be an expert in 
the legal field, must a person have gone to law school or have practiced as 
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an attorney for several years before joining the ISP?  To be an expert in 
music, must a person have a graduate degree in music theory or do they 
qualify if they have played in a band for a few years?  To hold copyright 
owners to this standard works a disservice to the intent of Congress in 
creating the safe harbor provision in the DMCA.171 
Alternatively, the standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Columbia 
Pictures, though not without its flaws, establishes a more realistic burden 
for the copyright owner to prove their case.172  The Columbia Pictures 
Court found that the Viacom requirement of a showing of subjective 
awareness of “facts and circumstances” that would make it objectively 
obvious to a reasonable person could be satisfied by a showing that “[t]he 
material in question was sufficiently current and well-known” or 
famous.173  This standard does not require or expect a “reasonable person” 
to have expertise in both music/media and in law in order to recognize a 
well-known, famous song or movie in an amateur video posted on an ISP’s 
server.174  A less stringent standard such as the one enunciated by the Ninth 
Circuit would afford copyright owners greater potential to carry their 
burden in proving red-flag knowledge of infringing activity on the part of 
ISPs.  In practice, this standard would also conform to the legislative intent 
in enacting the DMCA to strike a balance between the interests of 
copyright owners and those of unknowing ISPs.175 
Does an objectively reasonable person have to be an expert in either 
music/media or law for it to be objectively obvious when they hear Katy 
Perry’s song Firework or Eminem’s The Real Slim Shady that they are 
listening to a copyrighted song?176  One would think that any objective 
fact-finder would determine that these songs are “famous” or “sufficiently 
current and well-known” if for no other reason than the fact that these 
songs have sold millions of copies and are featured regularly in pop 
culture.177  However, the Ninth Circuit’s standard is not perfect either.178  
With a standard such as the one in Columbia Pictures, the question would 
inevitably be raised as to what “famous” means or what constitutes 
                                                                                                                                  
 171 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2010) (this section of the DMCA contains the safe harbor 
provisions). 
 172 See Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1020. 
 173 Id. at 1043 (referencing Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 
2012), which established the “subjectively obvious to an objectively reasonable person” 
standard). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Nimmer on Copyright § 12B.04(A)(1)(b) (2015). 
 176 KATY PERRY, Firework, on TEENAGE DREAM (Capitol Records 2010); EMINEM, The 
Real Slim Shady, on THE MARSHALL MATHERS LP (Interscope Records 2000). 
 177 See Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d 1020. 
 178 See id. 
2018] An Analysis of Red-Flag Knowledge Under the DMCA 339 
“sufficiently current and well-known” material.179  The word “famous” as 
defined by Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary means “widely known” or 
“honored for achievement.”180  Such a definition does not present a 
definitive test by which a fact-finder could determine that any piece of 
copyrighted material was famous, in that it is objectively obvious to a 
reasonable person.  Therefore, a modified version of the Ninth Circuit 
standard would truly comport with the legislative intent underlying the 
DMCA.181 
Another consideration that must be accounted for by the Supreme 
Court is that of “fair use.”182  The principle of fair use is codified in the 
Copyright Act and states that “the fair use of copyrighted work, including 
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other 
means . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching . . . or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”183  The 
purpose of fair use is to allow greater use of a copyrighted work that does 
not impinge on the purpose or nature of the original copyrighted work and 
does not use more of the work than is necessary.184  Therefore, if 
copyrighted works that are made available on ISP servers qualify as fair 
use, they are statutorily protected and must be given due recognition. 
B. Common-Law Tort Principles of Negligence and Respondeat 
Superior May Provide the Necessary Guidance for a Modified Standard 
Courts have applied common-law tort principles such as duty and 
breach of duty to non-tort cases, in an attempt to delineate bright-line rules 
or standards to be applicable when abstract or vague principles are the only 
guides.185  One test that may have application in determining the 
appropriate standard for a finding of “red-flag” knowledge is the “Learned 
Hand Test” or Cost-Benefit Analysis test outlined by Judge Learned Hand 
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.186 In the tort context, the test 
operates as follows: if the burden of adequate precautions is greater or 
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equal to the probability of an accident, times the gravity (cost) of liability, 
then the necessary precautions to prevent such an injury are not 
required.187  What this comment is suggesting is that the potential 
application of a modified “Learned Hand Test” to determine the threshold 
for red-flag knowledge under the DMCA.188  A modified “Learned Hand 
Test” could look something like this: if the cost (either temporal or money) 
of determining whether material posted on an ISP’s server infringes a 
copyright is greater than or equal to the percentage (probability) of works 
that are being infringed on the site, times the cost of liability on the ISP, 
then a finding of red-flag knowledge cannot be made.189  Of course, some 
alterations to this classic tort principle would be necessary in order for it 
to be applicable in copyright infringement cases, but such a test may 
provide the bright-line test that copyright law needs. 
Another common-law tort principle that may provide clarity in 
determining the existence of red-flag knowledge on the part of ISPs is 
respondeat superior.  The principle of respondeat superior is a way of 
holding an actor vicariously or contributorily liable for the tortious acts of 
another, specifically in the context of an employer-employee 
relationship.190  Under this principle, a master (employer) can be held 
responsible for the acts of their servant (employee) if such acts are 
committed in the course of their employment.191  While this principle is 
usually limited to the employer-employee context, once again a modified 
version of this principle could be made applicable in the DMCA copyright 
context. A modified version would need to provide courts with the ability 
to justify holding ISPs liable for the acts of their employees who either 
encourage or willfully ignore infringing activities.  Under such a principle, 
the courts, when confronted with evidence that an ISP’s employees or 
users that are paid for their content uploads (which is common practice on 
platforms such as YouTube and Vimeo) are uploading or permitting 
knowing copyright violations, could use respondeat superior to find that 
the ISP itself had red-flag knowledge. 
C. The Balance of Interests Favor the Ninth Circuit’s Interpretation 
As previously stated, in enacting the DMCA, Congress intended to 
strike a balance between the interests of copyright owners in protecting 
their rights and the interests of ISPs in disseminating information to the 
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 188 See id. (author referring to the “red-flag” knowledge requirement codified in 
§ 512(c)). 
 189 See id. 
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 191 See id. 
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public and advancing technology.192  There are various trends in the 
Internet and copyright industries, such as the proliferation of Internet 
piracy, which favors the necessity of the adoption of a standard of “red-
flag” knowledge that is similar to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, rather 
than that of the Second Circuit. 
Copyright laws have been routinely altered and amended throughout 
the Copyright Act’s history to keep up with the changing times and 
development of technology.  Evidence of these changes is clear from the 
transformation of U.S. copyright law, which was inspired by England’s 
Statute of Anne incorporated into the 1909 Copyright Act, then into the 
1976 Copyright Act, and eventually the amendment to the 1976 Act 
including the DMCA was crafted.193  Perhaps the time has come once 
again for legislative intervention to add a provision to the DMCA that 
states a bright-line rule for determining what constitutes “red-flag” 
knowledge of infringing activity. 
Another trend facing copyright jurisprudence and copyright-
ownership in general is the fact that many of these ISP platforms’ content 
consists primarily of infringing material, as explained by the Grokster 
Court.194  There is blatant statistical evidence of the pervasiveness of this 
issue. However, under the Second Circuit’s interpretation of red-flag 
knowledge, essentially no ISP would be found to have such knowledge, 
depriving copyright owners of the relief they deserve.195  This is yet 
another reason why a more moderate interpretation of red-flag knowledge, 
such as the one set forth in the Ninth Circuit, is needed in order to provide 
relief and comply with Congressional intent.196 
Finally, the development of the digital media market, and hence the 
development of Internet piracy almost brought the music industry to its 
knees at the turn of the century.  If nothing is legally done to dissuade 
piracy from growing and threatening the rights of copyright owners in all 
industries, the same catastrophe could occur again.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of red-flag knowledge provides a defense for copyright 
owners to combat such threats, whereas the Second Circuit’s interpretation 
leaves copyright owners defenseless against pervasive copyright 
infringement on ISP servers.197  Increasingly, copyrighted works are being 
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created and disseminated both legally and illegally via ISP servers.  If 
copyright piracy is allowed to go unchecked under the DMCA, it could 
have a disastrous impact not only on the ability of copyright owners to 
protect their exclusive rights, but it could challenge the very purpose of 
the Copyright Act: to disseminate useful knowledge to the public.  In order 
to prevent this from occurring, a less stringent interpretation of what 
constitutes red-flag knowledge is needed than the one set forth by the 
Second Circuit.198  The Supreme Court of the United States should grant 
certiorari on an appropriate case that raises a question as to what 
constitutes red-flag knowledge and make a ruling on the matter that adopts 
some variation of the Ninth Circuit’s standard. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Modern U.S. copyright law principles were established to allow 
those authors that create an original work in a fixed medium to be able to 
secure their rights in that work.199  In order to protect an author’s rights to 
reproduce (copy) their work, create derivative works, distribute copies to 
make a profit, perform the work publicly, display the work publicly, and 
(in the case of a sound recording) perform a sound recording by means of 
digital audio, enforcement in the appropriate cases must be a realistic 
possibility.200 
On the other hand, as the world continues to evolve into the digital 
Internet age, increasingly more ISPs are going to emerge with legitimate 
business aims, but which are easily exploited by copyright infringers.  The 
ability of these ISPs to shield themselves from undue liability is an 
important interest that must be taken into account by the Supreme Court 
as well.  The Supreme Court should strike a balance between the interests 
of copyright owners and those of service providers, which serves to also 
promote the intent of Congress in enacting The Copyright Act of 1976 and 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.201  The most effective way of 
analyzing red-flag knowledge is by adopting a standard that enables 
copyright holders to realistically hold liable ISPs that knowingly harbor 
copyright infringers, without requiring copyright owners to show that the 
ISP’s employees actually had expert knowledge of the legal field and 
music/media industry.  Copyright owners need protection and shelter from 
the modern storm of increasingly pervasive infringers on the Internet; it is 
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time for the Supreme Court and Congress to listen to Bob Dylan and say 
to copyright owners: “Come in . . . I’ll give ya shelter from the storm.”202 
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